A Recurring Problem at Boeing - Dreamliner Problems Trigger FAA Review

The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has launched a broad probe into the factory processes and safeguards of the Boeing Company’s (“Boeing") 787 Dreamliner (“Dreamliner”) production facilities. The probe will stretch back nearly a decade and comes in the wake of three separate quality-control lapses in the past year. (Cameron & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal). In an internal FAA memorandum (“Memo”) dated August 31, 2020, Boeing informed the FAA that certain parts produced at the Dreamliner factory in South Carolina had failed to meet the company’s design and manufacturing standards. (Tangel & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal).

According to the Memo, a high-level FAA review is considering enhanced mandated inspections that could affect roughly 900 of the 1000 Dreamliners delivered since 2011. Id. Combined assembly-line defects related to the rear fuselage, or body of the plane, prompted Boeing to take the unusual step in late August to voluntarily notify airlines and the public that eight of these planes weren’t safe to remain in service, temporarily grounding the aircraft. Id. Ultimately, mandatory Dreamliner inspections and unexpected groundings will likely disrupt airlines’ schedules at a time the aircraft has become even more important for many carriers, as its size and long-range provide flexibility during the downturn in global passenger traffic related to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Cameron & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal). The production mistakes will likely also cause a slowdown in Dreamliner deliveries and potentially place Boeing in violation of an agreement with the FAA, triggered by past manufacturing failures. (Broderick & Norris, Aviation Week & Space Technology).

After discovering these imperfections, Boeing and the FAA have begun investigating the three defects, related to portions of the fuselage and horizontal stabilizer. (Tangel & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal). While Boeing has said the defects individually do not create unsafe conditions, when an aircraft possesses more than one of the defects, it could experience material fatigue under extreme flying conditions. Id. Typically, structural faults of these nature would prompt mandatory safety action by the FAA. Id. Historically, wide-body jets have an excellent safety record and are frequently used on international routes. (Broderick & Norris, Aviation Week & Space Technology).

These production errors and an imminent large-scale review of Boeing’s quality control practices come at an inopportune time; the company is currently working to address other safety controversies related to the 737 MAX and the KC-46A, a military fuel tanker. Id. Boeing’s previous flagship aircraft, the 737 MAX, has been grounded for more than a year following two fatal crashes related to software flaws and inadequate crew training. (Cameron & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal). Boeing’s voluntary grounding of eight Dreamliners contrasts the handling of the 737 MAX crashes when Boeing didn’t immediately call for the aircraft’s grounding even as global regulators began issuing flight bans. (Tangel & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal). Additionally, Boeing is grappling with ongoing quality control issues in both the 737 MAX and the military 767 variant, the KC-46A, due to numerous reported instances of tools and other foreign object debris left inside completed aircraft. (Broderick & Norris, Aviation Week & Space Technology). 

The resulting high-level review by the FAA will include an analysis of various data and production procedures, the extent of which suggests the agency’s concerns are significant. (Tangel & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal). Such a review of these frequent quality-control lapses may ultimately result in an airworthiness directive (“AD”), a legally enforceable regulation issued by the FAA to correct an unsafe condition in a product. 14 C.F.R. § 39.3 (2002).  This regulation, along with Title 49 of the United States Code, delegates authority to the FAA to issue rules on aviation safety. While the FAA has said it’s too early to speculate on a possible AD, deliberations about mandated inspections and how many Dreamliners might be covered have been underway inside the FAA for months. (Tangel & Pasztor, Wall Street Journal).

If an AD was issued for the Dreamliner, it wouldn’t be the first for the Dreamliner fleet, and it may place Boeing in violation of a 2015 agreement with the FAA triggered by past manufacturing failures. (Broderick & Norris | Aviation Week & Space Technology). In November 2012, the FAA issued an AD after tracing fuel leaks on two in-service Dreamliners to incorrectly installed fuel feed parts. Id. Additionally, following a 2014 FAA review and battery overheating incidents related to fuselage shimming, another AD was issued grounding the Dreamliner fleet for 123 days. Id. In December 2015, Boeing and the FAA entered into a settlement regarding a total of 13 quality-control deficiencies that have affected several Boeing aircraft programs, including the Dreamliner. Id. The settlement required Boeing to pay $12 million and commit to a series of process improvements, through a period ending January 2021. Id.

Given the several high-profile controversies at Boeing in recent years, including several involving the Dreamliner, the question must be asked, how do these events keep happening? After the most recent foul-up with the Dreamliner program, Boeing was quick to applaud its revamped safety-review process, implemented after the two fatal 737 MAX accidents. While it is reassuring the lapses were caught before a disaster, one cannot simply accept when a failure is avoided by the redundancy. In an industry that prides itself on redundancies, a thorough review must be conducted to see why the first failure happened—why the redundancy had to be employed. While the FAA is launching this review, failures will continue to happen at Boeing unless additional action is taken. The FAA should consider not simply releasing another AD, but rather using its regulatory authority to address the culture at Boeing and its factories, from the bottom, up. Specifically, the FAA must confront Boeing on why simple failures, such as switching off a quality-control computer system or leaving behind tools in the body of a finished airplane, happen so frequently.